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s 13332 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE August 6, 1971 
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I 
would like to be heard, too, at that time. 
However, I suggest that the request be 
made first. 
Mr. SCOTT. Mr. President, I will with-
hold my request. 
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, the com-
mittee having considered and disposed 
of this conference report, I ask unani-
mous consent that the time for debate 
be limited to 2 hours to the side, under 
the proper procedures as to the control 
of time, and that at the conclusion of 
that time or when the time might be 
yielded back, we proceed to a vote on the 
adoption of the conference report. 
Mr. GRAVEL. Mr. President, reserving 
the right to object, and I shall object, I 
would like now to permit the majority 
and the minority leaders to speak. Or 
does my objection stop further debate 
on this? 
Mr. MANSFIELD. Not at all. 
Mr. GRAVEL. I reserve the right to 
object, and I want to announce that I 
shall object. 
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, may I 
propose in lieu of the original proposal 
that if anyone has any suggestion as to 
what time they think would be more 
proper, I would be glad to consider it 
and perhaps agree to it. I ask unanimous 
consent that we have 3 hours of debate 
on each side. 
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there 
objection? 
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, re-
serving the right to object, I think 1t is 
rather late .in the day and late in the 
first phase of this session to bring a con-
ference report of this magnitude before 
the Senate. 
I would point out that my figures are 
not up to date. Unfortunately, the De-
fense Department has not forwarded to 
me the weekly casualty list for the past 
several weeks. I am sure that it was an 
oversight. However, as of July 10, less 
than a month ago, 300,871 Americans 
were wounded; 45,373 Americans died 
in combat; 9,653 Americans died in non-
combat capacities-55,026 Americans 
dead in Vietnam, in Southeast Asia; 
355,897 American casualties as of July 10, 
1971. 
Just lately I received some lnforma-
tion relative to the number of amputee 
casualties because of the war in South-
east Asia. 
In 1966, there were 88. 
In 1967, there were 203. 
In 1968, there were 439. 
In 1969, there were 609. 
In 1970, there were 312. 
From January to April 1971, there 
were 72. 
There have been a total of 1,723 
amputees. 
In regard to the number of servicemen 
in Southeast Asia who are addicted to 
drugs, I am informed by the Assistant 
Secretary of Defense for Health and En-
vironment: 
We are now engaged In an enlarging test-
Ing program to determine the extent of drug 
addiction there. Based on ava.lla.ble data, 
the number of addicted servicemen appears 
to be considerably fewer than 40,000. We 
anticipate more a.ccurate estimates as the 
detection program proceeds. The highest pri-
ority attention Is being given to control of 
drug tralfic. detection of addiction, and treat-
ment and rehabilitation of servicemen who 
become victims of drug addiction. 
It 1s high time. It is long past time. 
This 1s the longest war, I believe, in 
the history of this Republic. It is the 
second most costly war in the history of 
this Republic. This war has cost us 
around $120 to $130 billion conservative-
ly speaking. Not only do the cities of 
Southeast Asia burn, but the cities at 
home also bum because of riots and pov-
erty and ghettos. 
So, we have the casualties, 355,000 
Americans, and we have the cost which 
will be doubled and redoubled into the 
next century. And we have the growing 
drug problem. Yet a Senate amendment, 
which the Senate adopted by a vote of 
61 to 37, calling for a total pullout of 
U.S. troops within 9 m<>nths 1f at the 
same time all POW's are released and all 
missing in action wherever possible are 
identified or found, was vitiated in a con-
ference between the two Houses. 
Of course the amendment 1s better 
than nothing, but that is not saying much. 
If we mean what we say, that our main 
objective before we· will withdraw is to 
bring ab<>ut the release of our prisonet s 
of war, why do we not proceed on that 
basis? Madame Binh, the chief Vietcong 
negQtiator, Xuan Thuy, the chief North 
Vietnamese negotiator, and the No. 
5 man in the North Vietnamese Polit 
Boro, Le Doc Tho, have made a proposi-
tion that they will consider a withdrawal 
in line with the prisoner release on a 
phase basis and apart and separate from 
the other five points in the seven-point 
proposal advanced in Paris a little over 
a month ago. 
Mr. President, some poople may deni-
grate the war in Vietnam and Southeast 
Asia. Some poople may try to shrug off 
these 350,000 American casualties. Sorr•e 
people may think little of the cost in tm 
area which is not, has not, and ner.er 
will be vital to the security of this cl'.un-
try. 
Oh, yes, I have read speeches pre-
pared-not given, but prepared-·about 
how the Southeast Asia Treaty was a jus-
tification for our going into Southeast 
Asia.. And I have had my name men-
tioned in reference to that fact because 
along with Secretary Dulles and our late 
colleague, former Senator Alexander 
Smith of New Jersey; I was one of the 
three U.S. signatories to that treaty. But 
that treaty applied to nations primarily 
outside of Indochin~the Philippines. 
Australia, New Zealand, Pakistan, Thai-
land, France, Indochina was brought in 
as a corollary under the umbrella of 
SEATO because at that time the Indo-
chinese states of Laos, Camb<>dia, and 
South Vietnam were outside the perim-
eter of the treaty. 
But the one thing which this state-
ment, which was inserted in the RECORD 
but which was not read, left out was thn t 
before this country would go to war t 
that part of the world under the tr"' , 
of that agreemen t would be .. due , ' 
stltutional proCf'f>fl ..... 'I 11c Senator f • •,. 
Montan:1 v:;. -- lh ..: nnf" l>ho insisted t: .. 
tho .. ' '" rds t-r tllllucled in that trea · 
and · r'ue consti tutional processes" de ;· 
not mean sign in& a Southeast Asia. Treaty: 
nor does it mean approving a. Gulf o : 
Tonkin resolution. 
This conference report is an import-
ant matter. For the first time, by an 
overwhelming vote, the Senate expressed 
its strong desire that this war be, 
brought to a conclusion within 9 months, 
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with the proviso that within that time 
there would have to be a phased release 
of U.S. prisoners of war to match our 
phased withdrawal. 
What have we got to lose? President 
Nixon has had in effect for two and a 
half years a policy of phased withdrawal 
of American troops. He is doing that 
already, and I give him full credit for 
what he has done but it is not fast 
enough. 
Do we withdraw as slowly because we 
want to give the Government of South 
Vietnam "a reasonable chance to sur-
vive?" Well, to my personal knowledge, 
since 1954, for 17 years we· have been 
equipping, advising, supplying, and aid-
ing during most of that time, paying for 
the cost of equipment which the South 
Vietnamese Army used. We have had our 
generals there since 1954. 
What do we mean when we say "a rea-
sonable chance?" Is 17 years not long 
enough? Is an army of 1.1 million men, 
equipped, trained, supplied, and advised 
by us not enough? Are not 355,000 Amer-
ican casualties enough? Is $130 billion-
only a third of the ultimate payment for 
this involvement-not enough? 
What kind of people are we? Why are 
we in Southeast Asia? What for, at 
what cost, and for what reason? It is 
about time that Congress woke up, as the 
American people have awakened, I re-
peat, to the casualties, the costs, the cor-
ruption, the drug addiction, and all the 
other evils and tragedies which have 
beset this country since this mistaken 
war got underway. 
We have paid far too much and gotten 
nothing but trouble, and dimculty and 
danger to ourselves. 
Yes, we can burn cities in South Viet-
nam, and in the delta, cities like Ben 
Tre. We can "destroy" those cities to 
"save" them. Our own cities are burning 
in a different way, but burning just as 
fiercely. Our own people are divided, not 
because of race primarily, but because 
of Vietnam and all it entails. Many of our 
own people are going hungry and our 
prestige has fallen in every continent of 
the world. 
I am not interested in face, personally, 
although I have my share of pride. I am 
not interested in prestige. I am inter-
ested in people, and the people I am 
most interested in are my own people in 
the United States of America. The coun-
try I am most interested in is my own 
country, the United States of America. 
We have a lot to talk about and every 
Senator has a tremendous responsibility 
in this situation, just as the President 
has, but this is not a case of adversary 
proceedings; it is a case of paying the 
piper for the mistakes which we have 
made for far more than a decade. It 
is time for us in this body, in this Con-
gress, and in this country to face up to 
our responsibilities regardless of the coot, 
and to act a.ocordingly. · 
I think it would be better, therefore, 
instead of trying to get a time limita-
tion for tonight or tomorrow, which in 
my opinion would be impossible to 
achieve, if we agree here and now to 
make this conference report the pending 
business on Monday, September 13, and 
at that time debate it, thrash out our 
differences, and see what our decision 
will be. 
Mr. SCOT!'. Mr. President, I believe 
the Senator from Alaska reserved the 
right to object. 
If I may yield 5 minutes on this side, 
I may say it would not be ditlicult to find 
fault with the sorry record of a war 
which has been going on entirely too 
long with its many tragic consequences. 
I think perhaps the point of variance 
here might be the difference on the as-
sumption of our much beloved friend, the 
distinguished majority leader, that be-
cause the enemy have indicated they will 
sever some of these points from the point 
of withdrawing and the return of the 
POW's, there is at the same time no evi-
dence that the enemy actually will do 
what he says. There is vast differenc0, 
as we have found out in 17 years be-
tween whlllt the enemy will do and what 
the enemy says he will do. 
The President was asked about this 
point at the press conference and his 
reply was that he understands-
There has been some crltlclsm In the Sen-
ate and the House that the adminlstratlon 
is not interested in negotiating a settlement, 
that we are not considering the various pro-
posals that have been made by the VC and 
North VIetnam. 
He goes on to say, on the contrary in 
denying that: 
We are very actively pursu1ng negotiations 
on VIetnam in establlshed channela. The 
Record, when It finally comes out, will an-
swer all critics, as far as the activity of thla 
government In pursuing negotiations in es-
tabllahed channels. It wou1d not be useful 
to negotiate in the newspapers ... 
Certainly, we want to get at it. Cer-
tainly we want our prisoners of war 
back, and certainly even during the re-
cess there may be developments. I know 
of none, but there may be developments 
with regard to these questions, including 
prisoners of war. We hope so. Negotia-
tions are being pursued and negotiations 
are being pursued hard and continuously 
and all the time. Therefore, what the 
distinguished majority leader and I both 
want, and that is to accomplish release 
for the prisoners and to find a way to get 
out of the war as soon as possible, could 
be achieved, I think, without impeding 
the adoption of a major issue which this 
Congress has supported under previous 
Presidents and should not deny, in my 
opinion, to this administration. 
It seems to me it also should not put 
itself in the position where the effect of 
the draft law, that part of it remaining 
on the books, operates to discriminate 
against those who have received defer-
ments and acted abundantly in good 
faith and who now may be subject to a 
callup because the lawful normal, regular 
operation of the law in accordance with 
the lottery principle has been delayed in 
this body, the Senate. 
I think it is unfortunare that we have 
to go into a recess period. Of course, if 
we do, I would hope that we could come 
to a time agreement when we come back 
and take it up again on the 13th of 
September. I think it is unfortu-
nate, and I point out that it is in no way 
the fault of the administration, that the 
draft bill is no longer the law, and it is 
not the fault of the administration that 
we got into the situation we did with re-
gard to the draft bill. 
We would like to see it disposed of. We 
stand ready to see that it is disposed of. 
The Armed Services Committee, for the 
most part, is ready to dispose of it. 
I well understand the impassioned 
feelings of the distinguished majority 
leader, I share them, but I do not see how 
the return of the prisoners of war is af-
fected by failure to enact the draft bill. 
I understand the language of the pro-
posed compromise would have the effect 
of drawing from the administration some 
indication tha t , following the release of 
the prisoners of war, it would only be a 
matter of a relatively short time before 
the withdrawal of American forces could 
be effected. But the administration is 
doing 1ts level best to remove prisoners of 
war, who were not taken prisoner under 
this administration for the most part; 
and it ought not to be impeded, it seems 
to me, by a requirement by the Congress 
that our negotiations for the removal of 
the prisoners of war be turned over to 
the Congress by virtue of the enactment 
of a clause in the draft bill. 
So I would hope that we would go 
through with the draft bill. I regret any 
objections being made. I would very 
much prefer that we act on it now, but if 
we do not, it seems to me it would be 
very useful if the majority leader and 
I could manage to secure an agreement 
on time when we come back. Otherwise, 
it may be that we will be debating this 
bill from September 13 for the rest of 
the year, which is something that I do 
not look forward to. 
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will 
the Senator yield? 
Mr. SCOT!'. Yes; I am glad to yield. 
Mr. MANSFIJ!:LD. Mr. President, I ap-
preciate the temperate tone of th~ dis-
tinguished minority leader. I know that 
every MeQlber of this body, regardless of 
how we vote. feels as we do about the ter-
nble cost of life in this tragedy in S"outh 
V1etnam and Southeast Asia. 
I agree with him that it is not the fault 
of the administration, but I would say it 
is the responsibility of the Senate and 
the House--the Congress-that we have 
a voice, under the Constitution; that we 
should recognize our responsibilities; and 
that we should act accordingly. 
No one is denigrating the President, 
because, stl"ange as it might seem, the 
desire on the part of Congress-and that 
desire has been evidenced since January 
20, 1969-is to help the President. For 
some reason or other, there are people in 
the bureaucracy downtown who have the 
idea that because we belong to Congress, 
we are natural adversaries of whoever 
happens to be President. They think that 
if the Republicans are in power, we Dem-
ocrats are against them. 
I think I can say without fear of con-
tradiction that this Democrat-controlled 
Senate, the Democrats in this body, have 
offered to this President every possible 
cooperation in the field of foreign policy. 
As fa r as the Senator from Montana is 
concerned, that -cooperation is going to 
be offered again and again and ·again, 
because the least important thing in our 
lives as politicians is whether or not one 
party or the other wins, whether or not 
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members of one party or the other are 
elected or defeated. For a little while 
we think it is important, but the thing 
that counts is the welfare of the Nation 
as a whole. This Republic is facing the 
most dangerous period in its history, and 
the times do not call for adversary pro-
ceedings. The times call for cooperation 
and accommodation, as we have in this 
body between the two leaders and be-
tween the two parties, and as we would 
like to do in relation to the administra-
tion downtown. We want to work to-
gether because, while it may be hard 
to believe because a politician says it, we 
all are agreed, in my opinion, that the 
welfare of the Nation comes ahead of the 
success of either party or any individual 
member. 
August 6, 1971 
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